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Cohen’s first model is a model of Zermelo–Fraenkel
set theory in which there is a Dedekind-finite set
of real numbers, and it is perhaps the most famous
model where the Axiom of Choice fails. We force over
this model to add a function from this Dedekind-finite
set to some infinite ordinal κ . In the case that we
force the function to be injective, it turns out that the
resulting model is the same as adding κ Cohen reals
to the ground model, and that we have just added
an enumeration of the canonical Dedekind-finite set.
In the case where the function is merely surjective it
turns out that we do not add any reals, sets of ordinals,
or collapse any Dedekind-finite sets. This motivates
the question if there is any combinatorial condition
on a Dedekind-finite set A which characterises when
a forcing will preserve its Dedekind-finiteness or not
add new sets of ordinals. We answer this question in
the case of ‘Adding a Cohen subset’ by presenting
a varied list of conditions each equivalent to the
preservation of Dedekind-finiteness. For example, 2A
is extremally disconnected, or [A]<ω is Dedekind-
finite.
1. Introduction
Cohen developed the method of forcing to prove that
Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis is not provable from the
axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel and the Axiom of Choice.
He then quickly adapted the known techniques for
producing models where the Axiom of Choice fails using
atoms (or urelements) to match the method of forcing.
His models, therefore, proved that the Axiom of Choice
2020 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the
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does not follow from the rest of the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. In this model, there is
a canonical set of real numbers which is Dedekind-finite, that is infinite but without a countably
infinite subset.
Over the years, we see time and time again how rich and interesting the theory of Cohen’s first
model is. Recently, for example, Beriashvili et al. proved in [1] that in Cohen’s first model there is
a Hamel basis for the real numbers as a vector space over the rational numbers.
From a modern perspective, Cohen’s first model is constructed by adding a countable sequence
of Cohen reals, and then ‘forgetting the enumeration, while remembering the set’ using a method
called symmetric extensions that extends the method of forcing and is the main tool in proving
consistency results related to the Axiom of Choice. We give an overview of this technique in §2
and an overview of Cohen’s first model in §3.
In this paper, we show that forcing over Cohen’s first model can have some counterintuitive
results. Our two main results to that effect are theorem 4.2, which shows that we can introduce
an arbitrary enumeration of the canonical Dedekind-finite set and the resulting model is itself
the appropriate Cohen extension of the ground model; and theorem 5.1 where we show that
an analogue of the Levy collapse adds a surjection from the canonical Dedekind-finite set onto
any fixed ordinal, but does not add new sets of ordinals. In particular, this forcing preserves
Dedekind-finiteness of sets in Cohen’s first model.
Forcing (or generic) extensions of Cohen’s first model were studied by Monro in [2], where
he shows that it is possible to add by a forcing extension a set which cannot be linearly ordered.
This shows that, unlike the Axiom of Choice, the statement ‘every set can be a linearly ordered’ is
not preserved when taking generic extensions. This line of study was extended more recently by
Hall, Keremedis, and Tachtsis in [3] where the authors study Monro’s model, as well as a generic
extension of their own doing, in order to show the unprovability of certain weak choice principles
related to ultrafilters on ω.
Some of our arguments (theorem 5.1 in particular) are based on ideas in another work of
Monro [4] (later developed by the first author in [5] and by Shani in [6]), where adding Cohen
subsets to Dedekind-finite sets is used iteratively to prove the independence of certain weak
choice principles from one another. In these works, it is crucial that no new sets of ordinals are
added, and in particular no real numbers. When working over Cohen’s first model, this means
that Dedekind-finiteness is preserved by adding a Cohen subset to a Dedekind-finite set.
In §6, we study Dedekind-finite sets which remain Dedekind-finite after adding a Cohen
subset to them. We give 10 different equivalent conditions for this preservation, and we show
that if the Dedekind-finite set is a set of real numbers, like in Cohen’s first model, then these
conditions are satisfied.
2. Preliminaries
Since we are dealing with models of ZF and with cardinals, it is worth clarifying what we mean
by cardinals. We say that a set X can be well-ordered, or that it is well-orderable, if there is an ordinal
α and a bijection f : X→ α. If X can be well-ordered, the cardinal of X is the smallest ordinal
in bijection with X. If, however, X cannot be well-ordered, we use Scott’s trick and define its
cardinal as the set {Y ∈Vα | ∃f : X→Y a bijection}, where α is the least ordinal for which the set is
not empty. The letters κ and λ will always denote well-ordered cardinals.
We say that a set X is Dedekind-finite if it has no countably infinite subset, although we will
use the term Dedekind-finite exclusively to mean that it is also infinite, as finite sets already have
a much shorter name. It is a simple exercise to prove that X is Dedekind-finite if and only if
every injection f : X→X is a bijection. We note that if X is a Dedekind-finite set which can be
linearly ordered, e.g. a subset of the real numbers, then [X]<ω = {a⊆X | a is finite} is Dedekind-
finite as well. This is because every finite subset of X can be uniformly enumerated, so the union
of countably many finite subsets will be a countable subset of X. Note that it is possible that X is
a Dedekind-finite set while [X]<ω is Dedekind-infinite, for example
⋃{Pn | n< ω} where each Pn
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is a pair, and no infinite family of pairs admits a choice function (such a set is sometimes referred
to as a Russell set, or a socks set).
Our forcing terminology is standard. We say that P is a notion of forcing if it is a partially
ordered set with a maximum, 1P. We call the elements of P conditions, and we say that a
condition q is stronger than a condition p, or that it extends p, if q≤ p. We also follow Goldstern’s
alphabet convention which dictates that if p, q are both conditions in P, then p will not denote a
stronger condition than q. If two conditions have a joint extension we say that they are compatible,
otherwise, they are incompatible. P-names are denoted by x˙, and canonical names for ground
model objects are denoted by xˇ when x is the object in the ground model.
For a set X, Add(ω,X) is the forcing whose conditions are finite partial functions p : X × ω → 2.
For a condition of ρ, we denote by supp(p) the support of p, which is the maximal (finite) subset
of X such that p : X × ω → 2. In the context of ZF, if A is a set, we denote by Add(A,X) the set of
partial functions p : X × A→ 2 such that dom p can be well-ordered and |p| < |A|.
Finally, given a family of P-names, {x˙i | i ∈ I}, we denote by {x˙i | i ∈ I}• the obvious name this
family defines, that is {〈1P, x˙i〉 | i ∈ I}. This notation extends to ordered pairs and to sequences as
well. Using this notation, xˇ= {yˇ | y ∈ x}•.
(a) Symmetric extensions
The method of forcing, albeit very useful, preserves the Axiom of Choice when it holds in the
ground model. In order to accommodate consistency proofs related to the failure of the Axiom
of Choice we need to extend the method of forcing. Let P be a notion of forcing, and let π be an
automorphism of P. Then π acts on P-names via this recursive definition:
π x˙= {〈πp, π y˙〉 | 〈p, y˙〉 ∈ x˙}.
Let G be a group of automorphisms of P. We say thatF is a filter of subgroups over G if it is a filter
on the lattice of subgroups, namely it is a non-empty family of subgroups of G closed under finite
intersections and supergroups. We say thatF is normal if whenever H ∈F and π ∈ G , πHπ−1 ∈F
as well.
We call 〈P,G ,F 〉 a symmetric system if P is a notion of forcing, G is a subgroup of Aut(P), and
F is a normal filter of subgroups over G . In all cases, it is enough to require that F is a basis for
a normal filter instead of a filter.
Let us fix a symmetric system for the rest of the section. We denote the group {π ∈ G | π x˙= x˙}
by symG (x˙), also called the stabiliser of x˙. We say that x˙ is F -symmetric if symG (x˙) ∈F . When
x˙ is F -symmetric, and this condition holds hereditarily for the names in x˙, we say that x˙ is
hereditarily F -symmetric. The class HSF denotes the class of all hereditarily F -symmetric names.
When the symmetric system is clear from the context, and this will always be the case, we omit
the subscripts.
The forcing relation can be relativised to HS, and we use HS to denote this relativization.
Lemma (The symmetry lemma). Let p ∈ P be a condition, π ∈Aut(P), and let x˙ be a P-name, then
p ϕ(x˙) ⇐⇒ πp ϕ(π x˙). Moreover, if π ∈ G and x˙ ∈ HS, then we can replace  by HS .
The first part of the proof appears as lemma 14.37 in [7], and the last sentence is an easy
consequence of the fact that x˙ ∈ HS if and only if π x˙ ∈ HS.
Theorem. Let G⊆ P be a V-generic filter and let M= HSG = {x˙G | x˙ ∈ HS}. Then M is a transitive class
model of ZF in V[G] such that V ⊆M.
The model M in the theorem is called a symmetric extension (of V). The theorem appears in [7]
as theorem 15.51.
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3. Cohen’s first model
Cohen’s first model is the classical example of a model of set theory where the Axiom of Choice
fails. This model was investigated by Halpern & Levy [8] where they prove that every set in
the model can be linearly ordered, and much more. (The model is sometimes referred to as the
Halpern–Levy, or the Cohen–Halpern–Levy model.) This model has many presentations in the
literature (see ch. 5 in [9] for a comprehensive analysis of the construction, for example). For
convenience of the reader, we give a brief overview of the construction here as well.
We assume that V satisfies ZFC,1 and we take P to be Add(ω, ω). Our group of automorphisms
is given by the group of finitary permutations of ω acting on P in the natural way
πp(πn,m) = p(n,m),
or equivalently: πp(n,m) = p(π−1n,m).2 And finally, F is the filter of subgroups generated by
{fix(E) | E ∈ [ω]<ω}, where fix(E) = {π ∈ G | π  E= id}.3 If fix(E) ⊆ sym(x˙), we say that E is a support
for x˙.
For each n, let a˙n denote the name {〈p, mˇ〉 | p(n,m) = 1}, i.e. the canonical name for the nth Cohen
real, and let A˙= {a˙n | n< ω}•.
Claim 3.1. If π ∈ G , then π a˙n = a˙πn, therefore πA˙= A˙. Consequently, A˙ ∈ HS.
Proposition 3.2. 1HS A˙ is Dedekind-finite.
Proof. Suppose that f˙ ∈ HS and pHS f˙ : ωˇ → A˙. Let E be a support for f˙ , and without loss
of generality supp(p) ⊆ E as well. Let n /∈ E be some natural number, and assume towards
contradiction that q≤ p is a condition such that qHS f˙ (mˇ) = a˙n for some m< ω. Let j< ω be such
that j /∈ E ∪ supp(q), and let π be the 2-cycle (n j). Then the following hold:
(1) π ∈ fix(E) and therefore πp= p and π f˙ = f˙ .
(2) π a˙n = a˙j.
(3) πq is compatible with q, since the only coordinates changed between πq and q are j and
n, but these are mutually exclusive to the conditions.
(4) πqHS π f˙ (πmˇ) = π a˙n which is to say, by the above, πqHS f˙ (mˇ) = a˙j.
Therefore, q ∪ πqHS ‘a˙n = f˙ (mˇ) = a˙j and a˙n = a˙j’. This is impossible, therefore the assumption that
there are such q and m must be false. Therefore, p forces that the range of f˙ is finite, and in fact a
subset of {a˙n | n ∈ E}•, so in particular, p must force that f˙ is not injective. 
In the following two sections, we work in the Cohen model. We fix a V-generic filter G⊆ P and
denote by M the symmetric extension obtained by it and the symmetric system defined here. We
will write an and A to denote a˙Gn and A˙
G, respectively.
Remark 3.3. One can prove that Cohen’s model can be presented as V(A), namely the smallest
transitive model of V[G] containing V and having A as an element, where G⊆ P is V-generic; or
alternatively it is HODV[G]V,A∪{A}, i.e. the class of all sets in V[G] which are hereditarily definable
from an element of V and finitely many elements of A and A itself.
The idea that V(A) is the symmetric extension is relatively straightforward, and it is worth
sketching the argument behind it. On the one hand, since V ⊆M, and A ∈M we immediately
have V(A) ⊆M. On the other hand, by analysing the proof of lemma 5.25 and lemma 5.26 in [9],
we see that if x ∈M, then we can assign to it a minimal finite subset, A0, of A and a name in V
such that A0 is the copy of a support of the name, and from this we can define x using A0,A and
the name from V as parameters. By induction on rank x we get that M⊆V(A).
1Traditionally, V is taken as L, but this is not important.
2While the latter definition seems more natural from a naive point of view, it is in fact the former that is easier to work with.
3Because we work with pointwise stabilisers of finite sets, using the full symmetry group of ω is the same as using finitary
permutations.
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4. Injective collapse
For two sets X and Y, define Colinj(X,Y) as the partial order given by well-orderable partial
injections p : X→Y. We note that Colinj(X,Y) is isomorphic to Colinj(Y,X). In this section, we will
focus on Colinj(A, κ) when κ is an infinite ordinal,4 and since A is Dedekind-finite, the conditions
are finite. It will be easier to work with Colinj(κ ,A) instead, and as it is isomorphic to Colinj(A, κ),
we can do that without a problem.
Let f : κ → ω be a finite partial injection, and let q˙f denote the following name:
q˙f =
{〈αˇ, a˙f (α)〉• | α ∈ dom f
}• .
Claim 4.1. If Colinj(κˇ , A˙)• = {q˙f | f : κ → ω is a finite partial injection}•, then (Colinj(κˇ , A˙)•)G =
Colinj(κ ,A). In particular, if p forces that q˙ is a name for a condition in Colinj(κ ,A), then there
is p′ ≤ p and f such that p′  q˙= q˙f .
Theorem 4.2. Let F : κ →A be an M-generic function for Colinj(κ ,A). Then F is V-generic for
Add(ω, κ). In particular, M[F] =V[F], and all cardinals are preserved.
Since F is not a filter, by M-generic we mean that in every dense D⊆ Colinj(κ ,A) in M, there is
some p ∈D such that p⊆ F. In other words, F is the function given by the generic filter.
Proof. For a pair p ∈ P (where P = Add(ω, ω)) and a name q˙f , let rp,f be the condition in Add(ω, κ)
defined by rp,f (α,n) = p(f (α),n).
If D∗ is a dense subset of Add(ω, κ), then we define a name for a subset of Colinj(κ ,A):
D˙= {〈p, q˙f 〉 | ∃r ∈D∗ such that f : supp(r) → ω is injective and r= rp,f }.
We claim that D˙ is a name for a dense set. Suppose that q˙f ′ is a name for a condition. Let p′ be some
condition such that supp(p′) = rng f ′ (we may extend f ′ if necessary, thus strengthening q˙f ′ ), and
let r′ = rp′,f ′ . By density, there is some r ∈D∗ such that r≤ r′, then we can extend f ′ to any injective
f and define p by p(f (α),n) = r(α,n). Then by definition, 〈p, q˙f 〉 ∈ D˙ so p q˙f ∈ D˙. But p≤ p′ and
q˙f ′ ⊆ q˙f . In other words, for every name q˙f ′ for a condition in Colinj(κ ,A) we showed that every
condition in P can be strengthened to one which forces some extension of q˙f ′ to be in D˙.
Suppose now that F is an M-generic function for Colinj(κ ,A), and let D∗ ∈V be a dense open
subset of Add(ω, κ). Let D˙ be the name obtained from D∗ as above. Since F is M-generic, there is
some p ∈G and q˙f such that for some r ∈D∗, r= rp,f and q˙Gf ⊆ F. But this means that r⊆ F, when F
is seen as a function from κ × ω → 2, replacing each Cohen real in A by its characteristic function.
Therefore, F is V-generic for Add(ω, κ) as wanted. Finally, since A= rngF and M=V(A) ⊆V[F],
we have M[F] =V[F] as well. 
Corollary 4.3. The symmetric extension of V given by imitating Cohen’s first model, using Add(ω, κ)
(with finitary permutations of κ , etc.) and F as in theorem 4.2 as the generic, is M.
Proof. This is true since M=V(A), and the argument for this equality is the same even when
using Add(ω, κ), which is easy to see from analysing the same proofs as in the case κ = ω.5 
Remark 4.4. The corollary means that the process works in reverse as well, namely, starting
with Add(ω, λ) with finitary permutations of λ and a filter of subgroups generated by pointwise
stabilisers of finite subsets of λ, we end up with an analogue of the Cohen model where we have
a set of Cohen reals which is Dedekind-finite. Using finite injective functions f : κ → λ provides
us with the same proof as above.
This result is odd. Indeed, upon first reading, it makes no sense. It quite literally implies that
there is a bijection between ω and κ . But we should point out that all it implies inside V is that there
is a generic bijection between them, i.e. we can generically collapse κ to be countable. Moreover,
4We can of course assume it is a cardinal, but the assumption is never used.
5We can also obtain the same by applying Feferman’s theorem appearing as Problem 23 in ch. 5 of [9] instead of the proof
analysis.
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the generic objects that we always refer to are not guaranteed to exist ‘out of the blue’, rather we
have a working assumption that V is some countable transitive model in a larger universe. And
of course, under this assumption, κ is in fact a countable ordinal.
In the case where κ is singular of countable cofinality (recall that we only required that κ is
infinite), it is well-known that adding ℵω Cohen reals (to a model of CH, at least), adds ℵω+1 of
them. When we move from A having order-type ω1 to ωω, we seemingly add a lot more reals,
which will soon disappear as we move again, say to ω2. This is the place to point out, of course,
that the additional reals are the consequence of being able to define new reals from certain infinite
subsequences of the generic, none of which is symmetric enough to enter the Cohen model itself.
And finally, a question.
Question 4.5. It is known that the Cohen model is rather impoverished when it comes to
variety of Dedekind-finite set. Indeed, every Dedekind-finite set can be taken as a subset of
ω × [A]<ω. Will the results be similar if we replace A by any other Dedekind-finite set in the
Cohen model?
One should make the obvious, and immediate, observation that taking the above question at
face value the answer is no. Split A into two infinite parts, A0 and A1 (e.g. those reals which
include 0 and those that omit it), and force with Colinj(κ ,A0) instead. It is not hard to see that we
do not add any enumeration of A1, which therefore remains Dedekind-finite. However, over the
symmetric model that is V(A0), the result was indeed the same as above.
5. ‘Levy collapse’ without adding reals (or sets of ordinals)
For two sets X and Y, denote by Col(X,Y) the set of partial functions p : X→Y such that |p| is well-
ordered and |p| < |X|, ordered by reverse inclusion. This coincides with the standard definition
when X can be well-ordered, but we will focus on the case where X=A in Cohen’s first model,
meaning that the conditions are, as before, finite functions.
In a manner similar to claim 4.1, if q ∈ Col(A, κ) is a condition, where κ is some well-ordered
cardinal, then there is some f : ω → κ in V such that q= q˙Gf , with q˙f defined as in §4.
Theorem 5.1. Let κ be an infinite cardinal and let G⊆Col(A, κ) be an M-generic filter. Then M and
M[G] have the same sets of ordinals.
Proof. Let X˙ ∈M be a Col(A, κ)-name for a set of ordinals. It is easier to consider X˙ as a name in
the iteration P ∗ Col(A˙, κˇ)•, whose projection to a P-name of a Col(A, κ)-name, denoted by [X˙], is
in HS.6 Moreover, since we have such canonical names for conditions in Col(A, κ), and we are only
interested in this iteration of two steps, we may assume that the conditions in this iteration have
the form 〈p, q˙f 〉.
Note that if π ∈ G , then π acts on P ∗ Col(A˙, κˇ)• in the obvious way
π〈p, q˙f 〉 = 〈πp, π q˙f 〉 = 〈πp, q˙f◦π 〉.
Let 〈p, q˙f 〉 be a condition which forces that X˙ is a name for a set of ordinals, and let E be a support
for X˙, i.e. a finite subset of ω for which fix(E) ⊆ sym([X˙]). We may assume that supp(p) = E=
dom f . Suppose that 〈p0, q˙f0 〉 and 〈p1, q˙f1 〉 are two extensions of 〈p, q˙f 〉. Again, we may assume that
supp(pi) = dom fi for i< 2.
If p1  E= p2  E, then the two must agree on any statement of the form αˇ ∈ X˙. This is because
there is an automorphism in fix(E) moving supp(p0) \ E to be disjoint of supp(p1), which means
that 〈πp0, π q˙f0 〉 is compatible with 〈p1, q˙f1 〉 while παˇ = αˇ and πX˙= X˙. Here, we used the fact that
dom f = E, as well as the fact the conditions are not injective. Indeed, for injective functions
agreeing on their common domain is not enough to be compatible.
6While this is quite simple to understand in this case, a more general theory of iterations of symmetric extensions was
developed by the first author in [5].
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In particular, if 〈p′, q˙f ′ 〉 ≤ 〈p, q˙f 〉 and 〈p′, q˙f ′ 〉 αˇ ∈ X˙, then 〈p′  E, q˙f ′E〉 = 〈p′  E, q˙f 〉 already
forced this statement, and the same for αˇ /∈ X˙, of course. Therefore, the conclusion follows, and
therefore X˙ is a name for a set in M, given by the name X˙f = {〈p′, αˇ〉 | 〈p′  E, q˙f 〉 αˇ ∈ X˙}. 
This provides another proof of the known fact (see Problem 16 in ch. 5 of [9]) that two models
of ZF with the same sets of ordinals are not necessarily equal.7
Corollary 5.2. Forcing with Col(A, κ) over M preserves cofinalities.
Corollary 5.3. A is still Dedekind-finite after forcing with Col(A, κ).
Proof. Suppose not, then there is an injective function f : ω →A in M[H], where H is M-generic
for Col(A, κ), and f can be coded as a real, namely a subset of ω. However, by theorem 5.1 no new
reals are added, and therefore f ∈M. This is a contradiction since A is Dedekind-finite in M. 
Corollary 5.4. Every Dedekind-finite set remains Dedekind-finite after forcing with Col(A, κ).
Proof. There is an injection from every set in M into [A]<ω × η for some ordinal η, therefore for
a Dedekind-finite set in M we can take η = ω. But this means that if A remains Dedekind-finite, so
must [A]<ω, as A is a set of real numbers, and therefore every other Dedekind-finite set remains
Dedekind-finite as well. 
In M, the set A has a partition into ℵ0 different parts (e.g. by looking at min a for a ∈A, which
by genericity must obtain each possible value infinitely many times). After forcing with Col(A, κ)
we added new partitions of size κ , without adding new sets of ordinals. This is in contrast to the
results of Monro in [2]: in his model, the generic partition is an infinite partition of A which itself
cannot be split into two infinite sets making the partition Dedekind-finite.
Question 5.5. In the previous section and in this one, the proofs involved in a fairly meaningful
way the Cohen forcing itself. What happens when we consider a similar symmetric extension
obtained by using a different kind of real numbers, e.g. random reals, Sacks reals, etc., or even a
mixture of these? On its face it seems that the proof uses more of the fact that we take a finite-
support product of infinitely many copies of the same forcing, rather than the specific properties
of the Cohen forcing. To what extent can this be pushed?
6. Adding a Cohen subset to a Dedekind-finite set
Corollary 5.3 shows that the Dedekind-finite set A in Cohen’s first model is still Dedekind-finite
after forcing with Col(A, κ), and this leads to the problem of finding more general condition that
ensure this. In this section, we provide characterisations, in ZF, of those Dedekind-finite sets A
that remain Dedekind-finite after forcing with Add(A, 1) = Col(A, 2). The combined results can
already be stated in the following result, although some of the notions in the theorem are only
defined below.
Theorem 6.1. Let A be a Dedekind-finite set. The following are equivalent:
(1) [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite.
(2) Add(A, 1) contains no infinite antichains.
(3) Add(A, 1) contains no countably infinite antichains.
(4) Add(A, 1) has the finite decision property.
(5) A remains Dedekind-finite in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
(6) A is not collapsed in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
(7) Add(A, 1) fails to add a Cohen real.
(8) Add(A, 1) fails to add a real.
(9) Add(A, 1) fails to add a set of ordinals.
(10) 2A is extremally disconnected.
7This requires, of course, that the Axiom of Choice fails in both models.
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Some of these conditions (e.g. (1)) already imply that A is Dedekind-finite, but others do not
(e.g. (7) holds for A= ω1 when assuming ZFC, and (6) holds for A= ω even in ZF).
The forcing Add(A, 1) was recently studied by Goldstern & Klausner [10] where the authors
study the possible effects of this forcing on the structure of cardinals, as well as some specific
properties of the forcing, e.g. condition (2) in our theorem, that occur when A is assumed to be
Dedekind-finite with particular properties.
Our theorem admits an easy corollary, which is applicable to Cohen’s first model.
Corollary 6.2. If A is a Dedekind-finite set which can be linearly ordered, in particular a set of real
numbers, then all the conditions of theorem 6.1 hold.
In the proofs, we will use the sunflower lemma, a finite version of the 
-system lemma. Before
we state the lemma, we fix the following notation. A sunflower is a collection of sets, S, such that
for some t, u ∩ v = t for all u = v in S. Moreover, the set t is called the centre of the sunflower.
Lemma 6.3 (Erdo˝s–Rado [11]). If a and b are positive integers, then any collection of b!ab + 1 sets of
size ≤b contains a sunflower of size >a.
The above lemma, involving only finite sets, is of course provable without the Axiom of
Choice. Less obvious, though, is that the following lemma can also be proved in ZF, as was done
by Keremedis et al. [12].8
Lemma 6.4 (Lemma 4 in [12]). If X is an infinite collection of sets of size b, for a natural number
b> 1, then there is a finite t⊆⋃X such that for every positive number a, there is a subset of X of size a
which is a sunflower with centre t.
It is easy to see that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite if and only if there is a sequenceA= 〈An | n< ω〉
of disjoint non-empty finite subsets of A. We will call such a sequence a disjoint sequence. We fix
some more notation: for any K ⊆ Add(A, 1) we define suppK = {dom p | p ∈K}. Note that K is finite
if and only if suppK is finite.
Lemma 6.5. The following are equivalent:
(a) Add(A, 1) contains a countably infinite antichain.
(b) Add(A, 1) contains an infinite antichain.
(c) [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
Proof. (a) ⇒ (b) is clear.
(b) ⇒ (c): Suppose that Add(A, 1) contains an infinite antichain C. We show that for all
k< ω,Ck = {p ∈C | |dom p| = k} is finite. It then follows that D=
⋃
k<ω supp
Ck is an infinite union
of finite sets and hence [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite. Towards a contradiction, suppose that Ck is
infinite for some k< ω. Then suppCk contains arbitrarily large sunflowers by lemma 6.3. Since
their centres are all of size at most k, we can find two compatible conditions in Ck, contradicting
the assumption that C is an antichain.
(c) ⇒ (a): If [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite, fix a disjoint sequence 〈An | n< ω〉 and Bn =
⋃
i≤n Ai.
Define p0 : B0 → {0, 1} to take the value 1 on B0, and for n ∈ ω \ {0}, define pn : Bn → {0, 1} to take
value 1 on An and 0 on Bn−1. Then C= {pn | n< ω} is a countably infinite antichain. 
The equivalence of (a) and (c) was independently proved recently by Keremedis and Tachtsis,
see lemma 1 in [13]. They prove in theorem 3 a further equivalence in terms of the topological
cellularity of the space 2A.
Definition 6.6. We say that Add(A, 1) has the finite decision property if for all formulae ϕ(x˙), the
set Mϕ(x˙) of minimal elements of Nϕ(x˙) = {p | p ϕ(x˙)} with respect to restriction is finite.
Lemma 6.7. The following are equivalent.9
8We can actually use this lemma instead of the Erdo˝s–Rado lemma in the arguments in this paper.
9One can easily formulate this lemma and its proof without using forcing. Then Nϕ(x˙) is replaced by any subset N of Add(A, 1)
with the following property: if M is a subset of N that is dense below some p ∈N, then p ∈M.
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(a) Add(A, 1) has the finite decision property.
(b) [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite.
Proof. (a) ⇒ (b): Suppose that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite, and let 〈An | n< ω〉 be a disjoint
sequence witnessing that. Let x˙ be the Add(A, 1)-name for the least n such that the canonical
generic subset of A contains An. Let ϕ(x˙) denote a formula stating that x˙ is even. It is then easy to
see that Mϕ(x˙) is infinite.
(b) ⇒ (a): Suppose that ϕ(x˙) is a formula such that Mϕ(x˙) is infinite. We can assume that
Mϕ(x˙)k = {p ∈Mϕ(x˙) | |dom p| = k} is infinite for some k< ω, since one can otherwise construct a
disjoint sequence. Let M=Mϕ(x˙)k . Since M is infinite, suppM is infinite as well. By lemma 6.4, there
is some finite t⊆⋃ suppM which is the centre of arbitrarily large sunflowers in suppM, fix such t.
There are only finitely many possible values that a condition can take on t, in fact at most 3k,
where the third value stands for ‘undefined’. Therefore, there is a condition q with the property:
there are arbitrarily large subsets K of M such that suppK forms a sunflower with centre t and
p  t= q for all p ∈K. Since q is a proper subset of p if |K| > 1, it must be that q  ϕ(x˙), by the
minimality of p.
Subclaim. q ϕ(x˙).
Proof. Otherwise take some r≤ q with r¬ϕ(x˙). Then r is incompatible with all elements of M.
Moreover, take a subset K of M as above with |K| > |r|. Since suppK forms a sunflower with centre
t and |K| > |r|, there is some s ∈K with dom r ∩ dom s= t. We further have s  t= q by the choice of
K. Therefore, r and s are compatible. But this contradicts the fact that r and s force opposite truth
values of ϕ(x˙). 
But this is a contradiction, as q  ϕ(x˙). Therefore, Mϕ(x˙)k is finite for all k, and we can construct
a disjoint subset as wanted. 
Definition 6.8. A set A is collapsed in an outer model W of V if there is a subset of A, B ∈V, such
that V | |B| < |A|, but W | |B| = |A|.
Lemma 6.9. Let A be a Dedekind-finite set. The following are equivalent.
(a) [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
(b) A is Dedekind-infinite in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
(c) A is collapsed in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
Proof. (a) ⇒ (b): Assume that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite, and let 〈An | n< ω〉 be a disjoint
sequence witnessing that. Let G⊆ Add(A, 1) be a V-generic filter, and let B be {a | ∃p ∈G, p(a) = 1}.
Define f (n) = a whenever B ∩ An = {a}, which by a density argument happens infinitely often. This
defines an injection from an infinite subset of ω into A, and therefore A is Dedekind-infinite.
(b) ⇒ (c): Suppose that A is Dedekind-infinite in the generic extension, and let f : A→A be
an injection which is not a bijection, then there is some a ∈A such that f (x) = a for all x ∈A. In V,
by Dedekind-finiteness of A there, the set A \ {a} is strictly smaller in size, and thus witnessing
that A was collapsed.
(c) ⇒ (b): Trivial.
(b) ⇒ (a): Assume towards a contradiction that [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite, but suppose that
p f˙ : ωˇ → Aˇ is injective, and for simplicity, assume that p=1. Let ϕ(nˇ, aˇ) denote the formula
f˙ (nˇ) = aˇ. Let sna be the set suppM
ϕ(nˇ,aˇ)
for n< ω and a ∈A. By the finite decision property in
lemma 6.7, Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) and thus sna are finite.
Subclaim. For any n< ω, {a ∈A | sna = ∅} is finite.
Proof. Fix n< ω and let B denote {a ∈A | sna = ∅}. Towards a contradiction, suppose that B is
infinite. First assume that for all k< ω, there are only finitely a ∈ B with |sna | = k. Then Ak defined
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as
⋃
|sna |=k s
n
a is finite as well. Since the sets M
ϕ(nˇ,aˇ) are disjoint as a ∈A varies, 〈Ak | k< ω〉 has an
injective infinite subsequence and hence [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
Now assume that for some k< ω, there are infinitely many a ∈ B with |sna | = k. Note that k = 0
by the definition of B. Since the sets Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) are disjoint as a ∈A varies, the set S= {sna | a ∈ B} is
infinite. This set contains arbitrarily large sunflowers by lemma 6.3.
Let T be a sunflower in S of size 3k + 1. Since the centre of T has size ≤k, there are at most
3k possible values for restrictions to the centre of T. Hence we can find a = b in B and conditions
p ∈Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) and q ∈Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) with p compatible with q. But this contradicts the fact that conditions in
Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) and Mϕ(nˇ,bˇ) are pairwise incompatible. 
Note that sna = ∅ implies that Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) is either empty or contains only 1. Thus the subclaim
implies that Mn defined as
⋃
a∈A Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) is finite for all n< ω. In other words, there are only finitely
many possible choices for f˙ (n). However, 1 forces that f˙ has infinite range and thus
⋃
n<ω M
n is
an infinite subset of A. This allows us to construct a disjoint sequence in [A]<ω, in contradiction
to the assumption that [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite. 
Note that by the homogeneity of Add(A, 1) the above proof that (b) implies (a) does not depend
on the choice of a generic filter, and since collapsing A or making it Dedekind-infinite can be stated
as a formula whose free variables are all canonical ground model names, there is no dependence
on any specific condition either.
Lemma 6.10. Let A be a Dedekind-finite set. The following are equivalent.
(a) [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
(b) Add(A, 1) adds a Cohen real.
(c) Add(A, 1) adds a real.
(d) Add(A, 1) adds a set of ordinals.
Proof. (a) ⇒ (b): Let 〈An | n< ω〉 be a disjoint sequence witnessing that [A]<ω is Dedekind-
infinite. Let x˙= {〈p, nˇ〉 | p[An] = {0}}. A density argument shows that x˙ is a name for a Cohen real.
(b) ⇒ (c) ⇒ (d) is trivial.
(d) ⇒ (a): Suppose that 1 forces that X˙ is a new subset of some ordinal η, and let ϕ(αˇ)
denote the formula αˇ ∈ X˙. By the finite decision property in lemma 6.7, Mϕ(αˇ) is finite for all α < η.
However, the union of the domains of conditions in
⋃
α<η M
ϕ(αˇ) is infinite, since X˙ is a name for a
new set of ordinals. Thus it is easy to construct a disjoint sequence in [A]<ω. 
We equip 2A with the product topology. Moreover, let Np = {x ∈ 2A | p⊆ x} denote the basic
open set associated with p ∈ Add(A, 1). Note that 2A is a Hausdorff space. We will consider
the following notion: a topological space is called extremally disconnected if the closure of every
open set is open. Note that for Hausdorff spaces, this strengthens the property of being totally
disconnected.
Lemma 6.11. The following are equivalent.
(a) 2A is extremally disconnected.
(b) [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite.
Proof. (a) ⇒ (b): Suppose that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite. We will show that 2A is not
extremally disconnected. To see this, let 〈An | n< ω〉 be a disjoint sequence and Bn =
⋃
i≤n Ai.
Define p0 : B0 → {0, 1} to take the value 1 on B0, and for n ∈ ω \ {0}, define pn : Bn → {0, 1} to take
value 1 on An and 0 on Bn−1. Then U defined as the union
⋃
n<ω Npn is open. But the closure of
U is U ∪ {0} which is not open, since it does not contain any open neighbourhood of 0, where 0
denotes the constant function 0(a) = 0 for all a ∈A.
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(b) ⇒ (a):10 Suppose that [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite. Let NI be an open set of 2A given by the
union
⋃
p∈I Np. We will show that its closure is open.
Note that f ∈ 2A fails to be in the closure of NI if and only if there is some p ∈ Add(A, 1) such
that p⊆ f and Np ∩ NI = ∅, which equivalently means that p g˙ /∈ N˙I, where g˙ is the canonical
generic function A→ {0, 1} and N˙I is the re-interpretation of the union
⋃
p∈I Np in the generic
extension. But by the finite decision property, which holds by lemma 6.7, there is a finite set, M,
of minimal elements p such that p g˙ /∈ N˙I. In particular, C=
⋃
p∈M Np is a finite union of clopen
sets and thus closed. So the closure of NI is open, as wanted. 
We finish with a question of interest, as one should.
Question 6.12. As we observed at the beginning of this section, Add(A, 1) is the same as
Col(A, 2). Moreover, we proved in the previous section that Col(A, κ) does not make A Dedekind-
infinite, where A is the canonical Dedekind-finite set in Cohen’s first model. Is there a similar
characterisation as in theorem 6.1 for Col(A, κ), or even more generally for an arbitrary forcing
that adds a fresh subset to a Dedekind-finite set?
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